its own product must make a large capital investment in a plant before the drug has completed regulatory trials. If the drug fails, the plant may have little value (Tully 1994) . The prospect of ine¢cient capacity use has implications for how …rms invest in innovation and production capacity.
In industries where production asset speci…city is low, contract manufacturing o¤ers the potential for e¢cient capacity use because CMs can pool demand from a diverse set of OEMs. Sturgeon (2001) observes that increasingly, OEMs are selling their production facilities to CMs and focusing on marketing and design. Sturgeon conjectures that the emerging industry structure-with innovation and production managed by di¤erent …rms-reduces the cost of production and increases the rate of innovation. In response, our paper shows that outsourcing can either increase capacity investment or reduce innovation. We characterize the sensitivity of capacity and innovation to industry structure and the bargaining con…dence (i.e., the anticipated bargaining strength) of OEMs.
The …rst step in our analysis is to compare the traditional …rm model with a pooled model in which …rms share their production capacity and act to maximize total system pro…t. The e¤ect of such ideal pooling on innovation depends on how innovation a¤ects demand: If innovation increases the potential market size, then pooling increases innovation; if innovation increases the probability that a product is successful, then pooling can either increase or reduce innovation. Second, we show how innovation and capacity investments deviate from their ideal levels when pooling is achieved by outsourcing to a CM. The basic problem is that OEMs will invest in innovation only what they expect to recoup by negotiating a favorable supply contract with the CM.
We evaluate the e¤ect of outsourcing production to a CM on the pro…tability of the …rms.
Morgan Stanley reports that in the electronics industry, the set of OEM assets that are candidates for divestiture is substantial, with potential for more than $10 billion per year in sales (Fleck and Craig 2001) . Managers of such assets must decide whether to sell the plant and outsource production or keep manufacturing in-house. While outsourcing manufacturing can increase pro…t by improving capacity utilization, it may instead reduce pro…t by weakening the incentives for innovation.
For an OEM, an alternative to outsourcing production to a CM is to retain production and pool capacity with other OEMs through supply contracts or a joint venture. Although it has received less attention in the business press, outsourcing among OEMs is widespread. In electronics, the OEM outsourcing market, at $115 billion in 2000, is over 50% larger than the CM outsourcing market (Boase 2001) . For example, in addition to manufacturing its own computer products, Taiwan's Acer manufactures for Compaq and IBM. Pharmaceutical companies use excess capacity to manufacture for competitors (Tully 1994) . AMD and Fujitsu have been highly successful in their joint venture to produce ‡ash memory chips (Mahon and Decker 2001) . We prove that OEM outsourcing can result in excessive innovation relative to the ideal pooled case. If the bargaining power of an OEM vis-à-vis the CM is large, then total system pro…t is greater under CM outsourcing than OEM outsourcing. However, if OEMs anticipate being in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis the CM, the OEMs would do better to outsource among themselves than to sell their production facilities to a CM.
Literature Survey
While OEMs may contract for capacity, they are unlikely to make these contracts contingent on their early investments in innovation or on the resulting market conditions. In the economics literature on incomplete contracts, Klein et al. (1978) and Williamson (1979) were the …rst to argue that if a buyer and a supplier cannot write complete, contingent contracts and if the values of their assets depend on collaboration, then they will make ine¢cient investments. Grossman and Hart (1986) investigate how changes in asset ownership a¤ect the incentives for investment. In this spirit, our paper shows how industry structure-who owns the production facilities-in ‡uences the incentives for investment in innovation and capacity. Hart and Moore (1990) further illustrate how ownership in ‡uences incentives for employees as well as owner-managers. An implication is that consolidating our OEMs and CM into a single …rm would not necessarily achieve the optimal levels of innovation and capacity, because of di¢culties in providing incentives to employees within a …rm.
The economics literature on incomplete contracts is based on cooperative game theory.
However, the use of cooperative game theory to analyze problems in operations and supply chain management is very new. Several papers assume that capacity/inventory is noncontractible and examine how …rms invest in capacity and subsequently bargain cooperatively over its use. In contrast to the literature (all the papers referenced below assume that demand is exogenous), we assume that demand is endogenous, and that demand-stimulating innovation is noncontractible. Anupindi et al. (2001) and Granot and Sosic (2001) consider a network of retailers with independent stochastic demands: Each chooses his inventory level; then demand is realized; and the retailers bargain cooperatively over the transshipment of excess inventory to meet excess demand. Anupindi et al. (2001) propose an allocation mechanism (a rule for shipping inventory and sharing the gains from trade) that is in the core and creates incentives for retailers to choose system-optimal inventory levels in the initial stage. Granot and Sosic (2001) point out that this allocation mechanism will fail to achieve the …rst best if retailers can hold back some of their residual inventory. They propose two alternative allocation mechanisms that induce the retailers to share their residual inventory e¢ciently, but may not be in the core. In general, there are no core allocation rules that induce e¢cient sharing of residual inventories. Van Mieghem (1999) considers a setting in which one OEM can purchase capacity from a second OEM after demand occurs. The contracts he considers that are not demand-state-dependent fail to induce the …rst best capacity investment. Our analysis of contract manufacturing is di¤erentiated in that the CM owns the production capacity, and consequently, the OEMs are unable to trade capacity among themselves.
A simplifying assumption in our analysis is that the OEMs do not compete for customers.
Other researchers (Parlar 1988 , Lippman and McCardle 1997 , Mahajan and van Ryzin 1999 consider the inventory stocking decisions made by competitive retailers. A common insight is that this competition causes the retailers to carry excess stock. Anupindi and Bassok (1999) and Muller et al. (2002) consider the case where retailers instead cooperate in ordering and pooling inventories. Lee and Whang (2001) and Rudi et al. (2001) consider settings in which retailers trade stock after experiencing demand.
Another key assumption in our analysis, and in the aforementioned OM and economics papers, is that all parties have common information. Spulber (1993) considers a monopolist man-ufacturer that must allocate its scarce capacity across a set of buyers but does not know their individual or aggregate demand precisely. He derives optimal pricing schemes for the manufacturer, and proves that information asymmetry results in underinvestment in capacity by the manufacturer and ine¢cient allocation among the buyers. Cachon and Lariviere (1999) also consider capacity choice and allocation under information asymmetry, assuming a constant wholesale price. Tunca and Mendelson (2001) model multiple suppliers and OEMs which contract for supply and then, after obtaining private demand information, trade in an exchange.
The paper is organized as follows. §1 evaluates the impact of pooling capacity. §2 explores the setting where OEMs outsource production to a CM. §3 explores the issues in the previous two sections using a distinct innovation-demand model. §4 provides concluding remarks.
The Impact of Ideal Pooling on Investment and Pro…t
This section compares the traditional model in which each …rm builds its own capacity to meet its own demand with a pooled model in which …rms share their production capacity and chose their investments to maximize joint pro…ts. This ideal pooled scenario provides a benchmark for the system with contract manufacturing considered in §2.
Consider an OEM that is developing a new product. Assume that the price per unit when q units are sold is M ¡ q: With probability e, the product is successful and M = H; otherwise, M = L where L · H. The OEM must invest in production capacity c at a cost of k > 0 per unit, before the demand for the new product is realized. After the capacity cost is incurred, the marginal cost of production is, for simplicity, assumed to be negligible. The expected operational pro…t for the OEM is
Padmanabhan and Png (1997) employ a similar demand model, where e; H; and L are exogenous.
We extend this model to consider the role of investment in innovation to stimulate demand.
Early investments by the OEM in innovation (market research and product development) may in ‡uence demand through either the potential market size H or the success probability e: For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, basic research and clinical trials aimed at expanding a drug's therapeutic range (i.e., the range of medical conditions for which the drug is proven to be e¢cacious) increase the potential market size. Drug development investments aimed at increasing the probability that a drug passes clinical trials increase the success probability. For any speci…c drug candidate, innovation investments may be directed primarily at one of these two objectives.
We consider the case where innovation in ‡uences the potential market size …rst and examine the case where innovation in ‡uences the success probability in §3. Assume that the total cost of innovation f(H) is an increasing function of the market size H, twice di¤erentiable and convex, and satis…es f(H) ! 1 as H !H < 1. The OEM chooses a market size that maximizes his total expected pro…t, which is given by
Consider two identical OEMs which pool their production capacity. The maximum expected pro…t that they can achieve jointly is
where
Here, c denotes the production capacity per OEM and H i is the potential market size for OEM i, for i = 1; 2. Henceforth, we assume the OEMs should exert some e¤ort to innovate, i.e., that the optimal solution to (3) satis…es H P i > L; i = 1; 2: Subsequent sections evaluate the e¤ect of pooling on the optimal levels of capacity, market size, success probability, and expected pro…t. Throughout, the superscripts P and 0 indicate pooling or the absence of it. For example, the optimal capacity investment per OEM in the system with pooling is denoted c P , whereas optimal capacity for the isolated OEM is c 
In many contexts, investments in innovation (research and development, product design, marketing) yield diminishing returns in terms of their impact on the market size (equivalently, the marginal cost of innovation is increasing). Condition (5) simply requires that the marginal cost of e¤ort be increasing su¢ciently rapidly. While this need not hold in every context, focusing on the case of unique, symmetric solutions greatly facilitates analytical comparisons. The following proposition compares the solutions to problems (2) and (3). De…ne H = L + 2k=e 2 :
Proposition 1 The optimization problem (2) has a unique solution H
0
. The optimization problem (3) has a unique solution, and it is symmetric:
where the inequality is strict if and only if
Thus, innovation is larger when capacity is pooled. Two di¤erent insights underlie the proof of this result. First, for any …xed level of capacity, an increase in market size (either H or L) is more bene…cial when capacity is pooled. Therefore pooling drives the OEMs to invest more in innovation. Second, we have made a structural assumption that innovation increases not only the expected market size, but also its variability. Variability is highly detrimental to the isolated OEM.
However, in the pooled scenario, the OEMs are better equipped to handle variability, so they exert more innovation e¤ort. If L = 0; then the decision of whether to set H > 0 can be interpreted as a market entry decision. One scenario that may occur is H P > H 0 = 0: That is, by improving the e¢ciency with which capacity is used, pooling stimulates entry into a market that would otherwise be unserved.
Although pooling increases innovation, pooling may either increase or decrease the level of capacity. The proof of this result relies on the observation that when OEMs are faced with the same potential market sizes, capacity in the pooled case takes on more moderate values. To see this, consider the case where H (and consequently the optimal capacity) is very large. Then, the incremental value of additional capacity is larger for the isolated OEM because the probability that capacity will be used is greater (e > e 2 ). In contrast, if H (and consequently the optimal capacity) is small, then the incremental value of additional capacity is greater in the pooled case because the probability that capacity will be used is greater (e 2 + 2e(1 ¡ e) > e). The precise result is that
where H = max[L + k=e; 3k=(2e)]: This result, in conjunction with Proposition 1, yields:
An implication of Proposition 2 is that if innovation and capacity are costly (cheap), then pooling increases (reduces) the optimal capacity. For example, innovation and capacity may be relatively costly for pharmaceutical companies, especially …rms developing highly novel drugs (e.g., biopharmaceuticals). Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that in this context, companies that develop and produce their own drugs underinvest (relative to the pooled ideal) in both innovation and capacity. In recent years the pharmaceutical industry has been marked by considerable merger activity. Mergers of drug companies may not achieve the ideal pooled outcome due to incentive problems within the combined …rm. However, to the extent that such problems are overcome and that mergers do result in the ideal pooled outcome, our results suggest that mergers may lead drug companies to make larger investments in innovation and capacity.
Finally, we are concerned with the e¤ect of pooling on expected pro…t for the system as a whole. De…ne the gain from pooling as
Clearly, the opportunity for pooling cannot reduce expected pro…t for the integrated system, so ¢ must be positive. However, the magnitude of ¢ is very sensitive to the cost of capacity k and the success probability e. One might expect ¢ to be strictly increasing in k because pooling allows the OEMs to utilize capacity more e¢ciently. However, by repeated application of the envelope theorem, we have
Combining this with Proposition 2 yields @¢ @k
Surprisingly, the gain from pooling is maximized at an intermediate value of the cost of capacity k. If k is small, then H 0 is large and capacity is smaller in the pooled case; hence, the gain from pooling is increasing in the capacity cost. Conversely, if k is large, then H 0 is small, and the gain from pooling is decreasing in the capacity cost. By a similar analysis, we …nd that @¢ @e
The gain from pooling is maximized at an intermediate value of the success probability e, which corresponds to high variability in the market sizes.
Impact of Contract Manufacturing on Investment and Pro…t
To address the question of who should own the plant (i.e., the capability to produce) we …rst, in §2.1, compare the traditional model of §1 with a system in which an independent CM exclusively possesses the capability to produce. As before, both OEMs make early investments in innovation.
Then, they negotiate supply contracts with the CM. The CM invests in capacity at a cost of k per unit. Finally, demand is realized, and the CM allocates capacity between the OEMs. In making their investment decisions, all parties seek to maximize their own expected pro…ts. This model illustrates the incentive problems that arise due to an organizational split between innovation and production. These problems arise because innovation is not contractible: Each OEM invests in innovation only insofar as he expects to recoup this investment later by negotiating a favorable supply contract. Hence, joint pro…t is lower than in the ideal pooled model of §1. We characterize conditions under which the system with contract manufacturing achieves greater innovation and pro…t than the traditional model. Second, in §2.2, we explore how the OEMs can retain plant ownership yet pool capacity through supply contracts. We …nd that this yields greater pro…t than the traditional model without pooling. However, total pro…t may be either lower or higher than in the system with contract manufacturing. Presumably, if the introduction of a CM will increase the total system pro…t, OEMs should sell their production facilities to a CM at a price that re ‡ects the future operational pro…ts of the CM. However, we will not model the sale of the production facilities explicitly. Instead, we will focus on the individual product based innovation and quantity decisions, which occur relatively frequently and set the stage for the asset divestiture decision.
To model the negotiations over supply contracts and capacity allocation, we …rst introduce some concepts from cooperative game theory. A cooperative game consists of a …nite set of N players, and a characteristic value function v : 2 jNj ! R; which speci…es the maximum value that can be created by each subset of players. An allocation for the cooperative game is a vector x 2 R jN j specifying how this value is divided among the N players. An allocation satis…es the added value principle if each player realizes a fraction of the value he individually adds to the group
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) provide an excellent introduction to cooperative game theory.
Stuart (2001) proposes the biform game, in which each player i has a set of possible strategies A i and associated cost function f i : A i ! R . The pro…le of strategies chosen by the players a 2 £ i2N A i determine the characteristic value function v a : 2 jN j ! R for a cooperative game. As in a strategic form noncooperative game, the players simultaneously choose strategies. However, in addition to the immediate cost associated with his own strategy, each player takes into account the cooperative game that results from the strategy pro…le. From the added value principle and conditional on the strategy pro…le a, player i expects a net payo¤ of
where ® i 2 [0; 1] is his bargaining con…dence index. That is, he believes that he will appropriate the fraction ® i of his added value in the ensuing cooperative game.
1
In the simple case with N = 2, the Nash bargaining solution implies that ® = 1 2 : the two parties will split the gain from cooperation (Nash 1953) . The noncooperative solution concept of Nash equilibrium extends naturally to the biform game: Each player chooses a strategy that maximizes his own net payo¤ V i , given the strategic choices of the other players.
Pooling Capacity with a Contract Manufacturer
The two OEMs play the following biform game. First, they strategically choose market sizes
e H i and incur the associated costs f (H N i ). All parties observe the demand distribution and cost of production, and then a cooperative game ensues as the OEMs and CM negotiate over supply contracts. OEM i has an added value of ¦ P (H i ; H j ) ¡ ¦ 0 (H j ); where ¦ P (H i ; H j ) is the expected operational pro…t for the integrated system with pooling and ¦ 0 (H j ) is the expected operational pro…t that the CM and OEM j can achieve alone; i 6 = j. Each OEM has a bargaining con…dence of ® 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, the OEMs' strategic market sizes (H N 1 ; H N 2 ) constitute a Nash equilibrium if
We have assumed that the three parties bargain over transfer payments, but ultimately adopt supply contracts which will induce the CM to make the capacity investment that is optimal for the pooled system and allocate that capacity optimally between the OEMs after demand is realized.
We now justify this assumption by considering tradable capacity options 2 as a supply contract.
After observing the demand distributions, the CM sells c P (H 1 ; H 2 ) tradable options to each OEM with an exercise price of zero. Each OEM is guaranteed c P (H 1 ; H 2 ) units of production capacity, and the legal right to sell this production capacity to the other OEM after demand is realized. The investment of the CM in production capacity, c, must be at least 2c P (H 1 ; H 2 ) because he faces severe penalties for failure to ful…ll the capacity options. After the CM chooses his capacity investment and demand is realized, the capacity is traded in a cooperative game. The outcome is a capacity allocation that maximizes total revenue. The CM will participate in this trading only if he builds excess, speculative capacity, i.e., c > 2c
In the capacity allocation, the CM expects to obtain ® m of his value-added. In the event that both OEMs have high demand, this is
In the event that OEM i has high demand and OEM j has low demand, the CM's value-added is
In the event that both OEMs have low demand, the CM's value-added is 2 max
Therefore, the CM chooses the production capacity that maximizes his expected pro…t by solving the following problem:
Because R(¢; H 1 ; H 2 ) is concave and ® m · 1; his optimal production capacity is 2c P (H 1 ; H 2 ). That is, the CM will not build excess, speculative capacity. Thus, tradable options induce optimal capacity investment and allocation.
We proceed to investigate how the Nash equilibrium levels of innovation (8)- (9) di¤er from the ideal derived in §1. Consider the optimization problem
From Proposition 1 we know that it has an optimal solution, which shall be denoted (H
. This is a Nash equilibrium because it satis…es conditions (8)-(9). Furthermore, when the OEMs have complete bargaining con…dence (i.e., each anticipates capturing his entire value-added),
This follows from the observation that when ® = 1, problems (10) and (3) are identical. On the contrary, if the OEMs have zero bargaining con…dence, then the OEMs have no incentive to invest in innovation; because f is strictly increasing,
Although in principle, the Nash equilibrium (H N 1 (®); H N 2 (®)) need not be either unique or symmetric, Proposition 3 establishes that this Nash equilibrium is unique and is symmetric (the proof relies on condition (5)).
Our main result is that market sizes increase with the bargaining con…dence of the OEMs. This is highly intuitive: As the bargaining con…dence of an OEM increases, he has a stronger incentive to invest in innovation.
is the unique Nash equilibrium, and it is symmetric:
Furthermore, there exists® 2 (0; 1) such that
By comparing Propositions 1 and 3 we conclude that if the OEMs' bargaining con…dence is su¢ciently high, the level of innovation e¤ort (and resulting market size) will increase due to outsourcing. On the contrary, if the OEM has little bargaining con…dence, then the OEManticipating that much of the value created by his investment in innovation will be expropriated by the CM in the later contracting stage-will invest less in innovation.
Let c N (®) denote the optimal capacity in the Nash equilibrium, i.e., c
Because the optimal pooled capacity is monotone in the market size, (11)-(12) imply that
Intuitively, as the OEMs become more con…dent in their bargaining position and the expected market size grows, production capacity also increases. Outsourcing manufacturing can increase pro…t by improving the e¢ciency with which capacity is used. However, as demonstrated above, outsourcing can weaken the incentives for innovation, eroding system pro…t. On balance, which factor dominates depends on how much of his added value the OEM expects to capture in the contracting stage. Let ¢(®) denote the total system gain in expected pro…t due to outsourcing:
It is straightforward to show that ¢(1) > 0 and ¢(0) < 0: Further, ¢(®) is increasing in ®. Hence, if the OEMs' bargaining con…dence is su¢ciently high, then su¢cient incentives for innovation exist that the gain from outsourcing is positive. If the OEMs' bargaining con…dence is low, then outsourcing reduces system pro…t. Hence, OEMs that anticipate being in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis a CM should retain their production facilities rather than outsource.
The gain due to outsourcing is also sensitive to the cost of capacity. Because the cost of capacity varies by industry (e.g., such cost are typically low for software, high for semiconductors, and intermediate for personal computers), the relative attractiveness of outsourcing varies by industry.
Consider capacity costs su¢ciently small such that contract manufacturing is viable (i.e., it results in nonzero pro…t). For small, …xed ®, the gain from contract manufacturing ¢(®) is increasing in k.
(When ® is small, contract manufacturing reduces the total system capacity, c N (®) < c 0 , and thus reduces the impact on pro…t of an increase in the unit cost of capacity.) However, if ® is su¢ciently large, the gain from contract manufacturing ¢(®) is maximized at an intermediate value of k; as is the gain from ideal pooling. In conclusion, outsourcing is most attractive in industries where the capacity cost is moderate and OEMs are in a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the CM.
We have demonstrated how contract manufacturing may fail to achieve ideal pooling. Alternatively, the OEMs may retain ownership of their production facilities and pool capacity among themselves, eliminating the CM. The next subsection investigates how this shifts the incentives for innovation and capacity investment.
Pooling Capacity among OEMs
The two OEMs …rst strategically choose market sizes H n i 2 h L; e H i and incur the associated costs f(H n i ). As before, a cooperative game ensues as the OEMs bargain over the level of capacity investment. We assume that they achieve an optimal capacity investment and allocation of that capacity between the OEMs after demand is realized, either through supply contracts or a joint venture 3 . The gain from cooperation
¤ will be evenly divided, according to the Nash bargaining solution. Therefore, the OEMs' strategic market sizes (H n 1 ; H n 2 ) constitute a Nash equilibrium if
We proceed to investigate how the Nash equilibrium level of innovation di¤ers from the ideal derived in §1 and the level of innovation with contract manufacturing. Consider the optimization problem max
and let (H n 1 ; H n 2 ) denote the optimal solution. This is a Nash equilibrium because it satis…es (14)-(15). Proposition 4 establishes that this is the unique Nash equilibrium and it is symmetric (the proof relies on condition (5)). Our main result is that when the OEMs outsource among themselves, the resulting market size is greater than would be adopted by an isolated OEM but lower than in the ideal pooling scenario. That is, the OEMs underinvest in innovation.
Proposition 4 (H n 1 ; H n 2 ) is the unique Nash equilibrium, and it is symmetric:
Furthermore,
where the second inequality is strict if and only if (6) holds.
3 AMD and Fujitsu have a joint venture to produce ‡ash memory chips. The …rms cooperatively choose the capacity level of the joint venture's production facilities. Each …rm has the nominal right to purchase 50% of the output at cost, and is penalized for taking less than 40%. However, as the demand for ‡ash memory ‡uctuates, the two parties frequently renegotiate the contract which speci…es "cost" and "penalty" to ensure an e¢cient allocation of capacity among themselves (Doran 2001) .
The insight behind the proof of Proposition 4 is that by strengthening his alternative option, each OEM can improve his bargaining outcome. Therefore in deciding how much to invest in innovation, each OEM places weight on the expected operational pro…t ¦ 0 in the scenario without pooling (where the optimal level of innovation is lower than in the pooling scenario) although pooling is inevitable. This qualitative insight remains true even if the OEMs fail to anticipate the Nash bargaining outcome; insofar as the OEM anticipates that his pro…t allocation will increase with his "go-it-alone" alternative ¦ 0 , he will underinvest in innovation.
Proposition 4 implies that OEMs which own their production facilities increase their pro…t (relative to the traditional model) by outsourcing among themselves. To see this observe that
where the …rst inequality follows by Proposition 4 and the observation that 3 The Success Probability Innovation Model §1 points out that in some industry contexts innovation investments may be directed primarily at increasing the probability that a product is successful rather than increasing the size of the potential market. This section explores the setting where the OEM's early investment in innovation in ‡uences the product's success probability e, rather than its market size H: We demonstrate that the e¤ect of either pooling or outsourcing on innovation depends importantly on how innovation a¤ects demand.
When innovation in ‡uences the market size, pooling increases innovation and outsourcing leads to underinvestment in innovation. In contrast, when innovation in ‡uences the success probability, pooling may reduce innovation and outsourcing (among OEMs) can result in overinvestment in innovation.
Nonetheless, the primary qualitative results regarding the e¤ect of outsourcing on system and OEM pro…t are similar under both innovation models: OEMs that own their production facilities increase their pro…ts by outsourcing among themselves. Outsourcing to a CM increases system pro…t (relative to either setting in which the OEMs own their production facilities) if and only if the OEM's bargaining con…dence is high. If the OEM's bargaining con…dence is low, then outsourcing to a CM reduces OEM pro…t.
The Impact of Ideal Pooling on Investment and Pro…t
This subsection compares the traditional model in which each …rm builds its own capacity to meet its own demand with a pooled model in which …rms share their production capacity and chose their investments to maximize joint pro…ts. The formulation is analogous to the case where innovation in ‡uences the market size. For any given success probability, the OEM's expected operational pro…t ¦ 0 is given by (1). Assume that the total cost of innovation g(e) is twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, convex, and satis…es g(e) ! 1 as e ! 1. The OEM chooses a a success probability e that maximizes his total expected pro…t, which is given by
where ¦ P (e 1 ; e 2 ) = max c¸0 £ R P (c; e 1 ; e 2 ) ¡ 2kc ¤ R P (c; e 1 ; e 2 ) = e 1 e 2 2(H ¡ c)c + (e 1 + e 2 ¡ 2e 1 e 2 ) max
[(L ¡ q)q] : §1 demonstrates that when innovation in ‡uences the size of the market, pooling increases innovation. One might conjecture that a similar result holds when innovation in ‡uences the success probability. The main result of this subsection is that this conjecture need not hold: When innovation in ‡uences the success probability, the optimal innovation level in the pooled system may be larger or smaller than the innovation level without pooling.
Imposing a restriction on the innovation cost function ensures that (17) has a unique solution and that (18) has a unique solution and that it is symmetric. In particular, assume that for e 2 [0; 1];
Proposition 5 The optimization problem (17) has a unique solution e 0 : The optimization problem (18) has a unique solution and it is symmetric:
We now proceed to characterize the impact of pooling on innovation (Proposition 6) and capacity (Proposition 7). The following Lemma, which compares the capacities of the system with and without pooling for any given success probability, is helpful in the proofs of Propositions 6 and 7. De…ne
Lemma 1 For e 2 [0; 1); if e · e P ; then c P (e; e) = c 0 (e) = 0 ; if e P < e · e 0 ; then c P (e; e) > c 0 (e) = 0; if e 0 < e < e; then c P (e; e) > c 0 (e) > 0; if e · e · e; then c P (e; e) = c 0 (e) > 0; if e > e, then 0 < c P (e; e) < c 0 (e):
Proposition 6 characterizes the impact of pooling on the optimal success probability. The
Proposition demonstrates that when innovation in ‡uences the success probability, pooling may either increase or decrease innovation. In particular, if innovation is costly so e 0 is small, then pooling increases innovation. In contrast, if innovation is cheap so that e 0 is close to unity, then pooling decreases innovation. To make these results precise, it is helpful to de…ne
Proposition 6 If e 0 > e(k; H; L); then e P < e 0 ; if 0 < e 0 < e(k; H; L); then e P > e 0 ; where
Because market size is stochastically increasing in innovation, the OEM's expected operational pro…t is increasing in e; whether capacity is pooled or not. However, variability in the market size is more detrimental to an isolated OEM, and this variability is a strictly concave function of e maximized at e = 1=2: Hence, the isolated OEM tends to set his innovative e¤ort at high or low Proposition 7 characterizes the impact of pooling on the capacity level.
Proposition 7
If e 0 < min(e(k; H; L); e); then c 0 < c P ;
if e 0 > max(e(k; H; L); e); then c 0 > c P :
The result is analogous to Proposition 2: Under both innovation models, if innovation and capacity are costly so that the level of innovation for an isolated OEM is small, then the optimal capacity investment is larger under pooling. On the contrary, if innovation and capacity are cheap, then pooling reduces the optimal capacity investment. Pooling may simultaneously lead to reduced innovation and increased capacity. For example, if k = 20, L = 10; H = 31 and g(e) = 3e 2 =(1 ¡ e); then e 0 = 0:80; c 0 = 3:4; e P = 0:76 and c P = 3:6: Here, the reduced innovation of the pooled OEM corresponds to more variability in the market size, and the pooled OEM increases his capacity to compensate.
Finally, we turn to the impact of pooling on expected pro…t. We de…ne the gain from pooling ¢ as in (7), except for the obvious substitution of the decision variable e for H and the cost function g for f. As previously observed, ¢ is increasing in the cost of capacity when k is small, but decreasing when k is large:
The result follows from Proposition 7 and the repeated application of the envelope theorem to @¢ @k : One might expect the gain from pooling to increase with the market size H, as this introduces variability. Surprisingly, when the market size H is large, the gain from pooling actually decreases with H. The precise result, obtained by similar analysis, is that 
Impact of Contract Manufacturing on Investment and Pro…t
Having considered the impact of pooling when the OEMs make decisions to maximize the pro…t of the total system, we now consider the impact of pooling when independent OEMs seek to maximize their own pro…t. The traditional model in which each OEM builds its own capacity to meet its own demand serves as the base case for comparison. §3.2.1 considers the case where OEMs outsource production to an independent CM and characterizes when outsourcing increases system pro…t. An alternative means of achieving pooling is for the OEMs to retain their production facilities and outsource among themselves through supply contracts or a joint venture; this is explored in §3.2.2.
Pooling Capacity with a Contract Manufacturer
Consider the setting in which the OEMs outsource production to a CM. The formulation is analogous to the case where innovation in ‡uences the market size. First, the OEMs strategically choose success probabilities e N i and incur the associated costs g(e N i ). Then a cooperative game ensues as the OEMs and CM negotiate over supply contracts. As in §2.1, the CM and OEMs negotiate supply contracts that will induce the CM to make the capacity investment that is optimal for the pooled system and allocate that capacity optimally between the OEMs after demand is realized. In making his innovation investment, OEM i anticipates that in the subsequent contract negotiation stage he will capture ® of his value-added, ¦ P (e i ; e j ) ¡ ¦ 0 (e j ); i 6 = j:
Hence, the OEMs' strategic success probabilities (e 
e N 2 = arg max
Consider the problem max e 1 ;e 2 2[0;1] £ ®¦ P (e 1 ; e 2 ) ¡ g(e 1 ) ¡ g(e 2 ) ¤ :
From Proposition 5 we know that it has an optimal solution, which shall be denoted (e N 1 (®); e N 2 (®)). This is a Nash equilibrium in success probabilities because it satis…es (20) (19)). Proposition 8 (e N 1 (®); e N 2 (®)) is the unique Nash equilibrium and it is symmetric:
Furthermore, there exists a threshold® such that e N (®) is strictly increasing for ® 2 (®; 1]
Proposition 8 shows that, just as in the case where innovation in ‡uences the market size, innovation is increasing in the OEMs' bargaining con…dence. The optimal capacity in the Nash equilibrium is c N (®) = c P (e N 1 (®); e N 2 (®)): Consistent with the previous model, because the optimal pooled capacity is monotone in the success probability, the level of capacity investment also increases with
®:
Combining these results with Proposition 6, we conclude that if e 0 > max(e(k; H; L); e); then innovation and capacity are always lower with outsourcing than for an isolated OEM, i.e., e N (®) < e This tends to occur when either innovation or capacity is cheap. On the contrary, if innovation and capacity are expensive, then e 0 < min(e(k; H; L); e). In this case, there exist thresholds i.e., just as when innovation in ‡uences market size, outsourcing leads to higher innovation and capacity investment if and only if the OEMs's bargaining con…dence is high.
Finally, we characterize the impact of outsourcing manufacturing on system pro…t. De…ne ¢(®) as in (13) with the obvious substitution of decision variables e for H. ¢(®) represents the change in expected system pro…t that results when OEMs outsource production to a CM rather than build capacity to meet their own demand. As in the previous section, ¢(®) is increasing in ® and becomes positive if and only if the bargaining con…dence of the OEM is su¢ciently large. Thus, regardless of how innovation a¤ects the demand distribution, if the OEMs' bargaining con…dence is su¢ciently small, then outsourcing will reduce expected pro…t for the system as a whole; weakened incentives for innovation outweigh the bene…ts of e¢cient capacity utilization. The results in §2.1 regarding the impact of k on ¢(®) when innovation in ‡uences the market size also apply when innovation in ‡uences the success probability.
These insights are best illustrated and extended with a numerical example. We consider the system with H = 10, L = 0 and g(e) = e=(1 ¡ e). Figure 2 shows how a change in the unit cost of production k a¤ects the Nash equilibrium success probability and subsequent capacity investment, assuming that new products will either achieve a large market size or fail completely. Figure 3 shows the increase in expected pro…t due to contract manufacturing, as a proportion of the expected pro…t without pooling:
The case with high production cost is motivated by observations from the pharmaceutical and semiconductor industries, whereas the case with low capacity cost is typical of the software industry, where outsourcing of media production is common. When the cost of capacity is large, the potential gain from outsourcing is great, but
OEMs will not invest in innovation unless they expect success in bargaining over supply contracts (® > 0:4). In contrast, when the cost of capacity is small, the OEMs invest in innovation over a wider range (® > 0:1). However, pooling adds little value; indeed, unless ® > 0:8; outsourcing reduces expected pro…t for the system as a whole. The examples demonstrate that, consistent with the theoretical results, the success probability, capacity, and gain from outsourcing are all increasing in ®.
Instead of outsourcing production to a CM, the OEMs may alternatively retain ownership of their production facilities and pool capacity among themselves. The next subsection investigates how this shifts the incentives for innovation and capacity investment. 
Pooling Capacity among OEMs
Consider the setting in which the OEMs outsource among themselves. The formulation is analogous to the case where innovation in ‡uences the market size in §2.2. First, the OEMs strategically choose success probabilities e n i and incur the associated costs g(e n i ). Then a cooperative game ensues as the OEMs bargain over the level of capacity investment. As in §2.2, the …rms achieve the capacity investment that is optimal for the pooled system and allocate the capacity optimally. In making his innovation decision, OEM i anticipates capturing half of the subsequent gain from cooperation, so his expected revenue is ¦ 0 (e i ) + 1 2 ¡ ¦ P (e i ; e j ) ¡ £ ¦ 0 (e i ) + ¦ 0 (e j ) ¤¢ ; i 6 = j: Thus, the OEMs' strategic success probabilities (e n 1 ; e n 2 ) constitute a Nash equilibrium if
This subsection demonstrates that the e¤ect of OEM outsourcing on innovation depends importantly on how innovation a¤ects the demand distribution. §2.2 demonstrates that when innovation in ‡uences the market size, OEMs that outsource among themselves underinvest in innovation. The main result of this subsection is that when innovation in ‡uences the success probability, the OEMs may overinvest in innovation.
Consider the problem
and let (e n 1 ; e n 2 ) denote its optimal solution. This is a Nash equilibrium. Proposition 9 establishes that this is the unique Nash equilibrium and it is symmetric.
Proposition 9 (e n 1 ; e n 2 ) is the unique Nash equilibrium and it is symmetric:
Furthermore, e P < e n < e 0 if e 0 > e(k; H; L) e 0 < e n < e P if 0 < e 0 < e(k; H; L):
As in the setting where innovation increases the market size, the Nash equilibrium innovation level falls between the optimal innovation level for the ideal pooled system and the optimal innovation level for the isolated OEM. However, contrast with the setting in which innovation increases the market size emerges when capacity and innovation are cheap. Then, e P < e n < e 0 . The OEMs overinvest in innovation (and hence capacity). Therefore, introduction of a CM would reduce innovation, regardless of the OEMs' bargaining con…dence. Alternatively, when capacity and innovation are expensive so that e 0 < e n < e P , introduction of a CM will increase innovation if and only if the OEMs anticipate being in a strong bargaining position.
Although the two innovation models yield distinct results for the impact of outsourcing on innovation, both models yield similar results for the e¤ect of outsourcing on system and OEM pro…t. §2.2 establishes that when innovation in ‡uences the market size, OEMs which own their production facilities increase their pro…t (relative to the traditional model) by outsourcing among themselves. Further, outsourcing to a CM increases system pro…t (relative to either setting in which the OEMs own their production facilities) if and only if the OEM's bargaining con…dence is high.
Both results hold for the success probability model as well; the results follow from Propositions 8 and 9.
Discussion
Should an OEM sell the plant? Our analysis indicates that OEMs might do better to trade capacity among themselves rather than to outsource to a CM, particularly if the OEMs anticipate being in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis the CM. Plant ownership gives the OEM a strategic alternative to supply contracts, and thus improves his bargaining position. Unfortunately, this leads the OEM to make investments in innovation that improve his strategic alternative (going it alone) at the expense of overall system e¢ciency. In particular, the OEM will overinvest to ensure that a new product will be successful when capacity and innovation are cheap, and will underinvest when such investments are costly. Without plant ownership as a strategic alternative, the OEM will always underinvest in innovation, spending only what he expects to recoup by negotiating a favorable supply contract with the CM. From a system perspective, contract manufacturing performs well if and only if OEMs anticipate being in a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the CM.
However, our single-period model probably overestimates the ine¢ciency in contract manufacturing when the OEMs' bargaining con…dence is low. In practice, successful CMs seek collaborative, long-term partnerships with their OEM customers. Solectron Vice President Eddie Maxie reports that Solectron scrupulously avoids "price gouging" of loyal OEM customers when total industry demand outstrips supply. By the folk theorem (Fudenberg and Tirole 1995, p. 150-155) if our single-period game were extended to a repeated game, the OEMs and CM could adopt a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that would give strict Pareto improvement over their single-period strategies. Basically, the OEMs would invest more in innovation, and the CM, on observing auspicious demand conditions, would give them favorable supply contracts, making all the parties better o¤. With the discount rate (one-period continuation probability) approaching unity, the OEMs and CM could get arbitrarily close to the ideal pooling scenario. On the contrary, if the continuation probability were very low (indicating, for example, a turbulent economic climate), then the OEMs and CM could not do much better than in the single-period game.
We have assumed that the OEMs operate in separate markets. This is appropriate, for example, when a pharmaceutical CM contracts with drug companies that serve separate markets, or an electronics CM produces subassemblies for PCs and networking equipment. However, CMs also supply competing OEMs. For example, Flextronics produces cellphones for Ericsson and Motorola (Thurm 2001) . Competing OEMs may even pool capacity among themselves; the sales forces of AMD and Fujitsu compete vigorously in Europe to sell the ‡ash memory produced in their joint venture. Modeling competition between OEMs that outsource to a CM or pool their own capacity may be a promising direction for future research. Because the bene…t of pooling is closely related to the degree of demand correlation, explicitly modeling demand correlation may shed additional light on the impact of industry structures that involve pooling.
Although we do not model dynamics of the evolution of contract manufacturing over time, our results suggest that contract manufacturing might become a victim of its own success. Specifically, as OEMs sell o¤ productive assets and transfer production to CMs, CMs will grow in size relative to their OEM customers. Daiwa Research Institute reports that in electronics, because of the emergence of a small number of large CMs, bargaining power has shifted to these CMs (Sarmah 2000) . Further, as OEMs lose production expertise and capabilities, control may further shift to CMs. Our results suggest that an erosion in OEM power (bargaining con…dence) will lead to less innovation, lower total industry pro…t, and thus perhaps a return to vertical integration. (Indeed,
CMs have already begun to move in this direction, with companies such as Solectron selling their own "white box" PCs.) This hypothesis is consistent with the historical pattern in the computer, automotive and bicycle industries where industry structure has cycled from vertical integration to outsourcing and back again (Fine 1998 Proof of Proposition 1: We begin by establishing existence of optimal solutions to (2). Because the function f is continuous and f(H) ! 1 as H !H, the objective function in (2) is continuous and bounded above byH 2 =4, and achieves its maximum in the region h L;H´. Note that
so (5) implies that (2) has a unique optimal solution because the objective is strictly concave.
Existence of an optimal solution to (3), (H P 1 ; H P 2 ), follows by an analogous argument. Similarly, the objective function in (3) is continuous and bounded above byH 2 =4, and achieves its maximum in h L;H´£ h L;H´. To prove symmetry, let us assume without loss of generality that H P 1¸H P 2 . Observe that
To see this, note that the left hand side is given by
where Y (H 1 ; H 2 ) = max
25) follows by direct computation. We have assumed that H P i > L (i = 1; 2), so from the …rst order conditions for (3),
; this contradicts (5) so we must have H
To establish uniqueness, we observe that
so (5) 
Therefore, it will be su¢cient to show that
For the case H · 3L, we have
; 1); where c P (H) is the optimal capacity for the pooled system, the maximizer in (4). From the …rst order optimality conditions, c P (H)¸(H +L)=4 if and only if H¸H: Thus it remains to show that
Therefore (26) is satis…ed for H · 3L. For the case H > 3L, we have
Because c P (H)¸(H + L)=4 if and only if H¸H, it is su¢cient to show that e 2 ) ; thus, H > 3L implies k > 2eL; so that if k < L, then e < 1=2: Consequently, H > H 0 implies that (3e¡3e 2 )H +(1¡5e+3e 2 )L+(2e¡1)k > 0: Therefore (26) is satis…ed for H > 3L as well.
Proof of Proposition 3: First, we will assume (5) and prove that all Nash equilibria are symmetric (by contradiction). Suppose that (H; G) is a Nash equilibrium with H > G. Then
>From (25),
Combining (27)- (29) we …nd that
which contradicts (5).
To prove uniqueness, we observe that a symmetric Nash equilibrium ¡ H N ; H N ¢ must satisfy
and that if (5) is satis…ed, (30) has a unique solution. Finally, the result (11)- (12) is obtained by applying the implicit function theorem to (30).
Proof of Proposition 4: First, we will prove (by contradiction) that (5) implies that all Nash equilibria are symmetric. Suppose that (H 1 ; H 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium in market sizes with H 1 > H 2 . Then the following …rst order conditions must be satis…ed
It is straightforward to verify that
Combining (31)- (33) with (25) we …nd that
To establish uniqueness, we observe that any symmetric Nash equilibrium must satisfy the …rst order condition 1 2
and condition (34) guarantees that for all H¸L 1 2
so (34) has a unique solution. Finally, (16) follows immediately from (26) which was shown in the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 5: By arguments analogous the proof of Proposition 1, problems (17) and (18) have optimal solutions. We also observe that
and therefore (19) implies that the objective in (17) is strictly concave, so (17) has a unique optimal solution.
Next, we will prove that any optimal solution (e P 1 ; e P 2 ) to (18) must be symmetric. Without loss of generality, suppose that e P 1¸e P 2 . From the …rst order conditions
Condition (19) implies that e P 1 = e P 2 . Let Z denote the right hand side of (19). Using the envelope theorem, it is straightforward (though tedious) to verify that
de 2 · 2Z; so (19) implies that the objective function ¦ P (e; e)¡ 2g(e) is a strictly concave function of e, and problem (18) has unique optimal solution.
Proof of Lemma 1: (a) Note that e P · e 0 · e · e · 1: Suppose H < 3L: If e 2 ¡ e 0 ; e ¢ where to avoid trivialities k > (3L ¡ H)=2; then c P (e; e) = To complete the proof, it is su¢cient to establish the single crossing property From the envelope theorem and de…nition of e(k; H; L), @R P (c P (e; e); e(k; H; L); e(k; H; L)) @e 1 = @R 0 (c 0 (e); e(k; H; L)) @e :
We also observe that for any c; By examining the second and third derivatives of y(¢) and using H > 3L and H¸3k; it is straightforward to verify that y(¢) is strictly increasing on e 2 [0; 1=2]: Ifê¸1=2; then (40) Proof of Proposition 7: If e 0 < min(e(k; H; L); e); then c 0 (e 0 ) · c P (e 0 ; e 0 ) < c P (e P ; e P )
where the …rst inequality holds because e 0 < e (by Lemma 1) and the second inequality holds because c P (¢; ¢) is increasing and e 0 < e(k; H; L) implies e 0 < e P (by Proposition 6). If e 0 > max(e(k; H; L); e); then c 0 (e 0 ) > c P (e 0 ; e 0 ) > c P (e P ; e P ) where the …rst inequality holds because e 0 > e and the second inequality holds because c P (¢; ¢) is increasing and e 0 > e(k; H; L) implies e 0 > e P .
Proof of Proposition 8:
Recall that Z denotes the right hand side of (19). It is straightforward to verify that
As in the proof of Proposition 3, the results on symmetry and uniqueness follow from the bounds (41) and (42), and the implicit function theorem can be used to establish (22)-(23).
Proof of Proposition 9:
The results on symmetry and uniqueness are obtained by arguments analogous to the proof of Proposition 4, and (24) is a straightforward extension of the proof of Proposition 6.
